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THE "BASES" OF EXPERT TESTIMONY: THE

SYLLOGISTIC STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
TESTIMONY
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIEDt

Scientific testimony by expert witnesses plays an increasingly vital
role in various types of complex litigation. Issues concerningthe admissability of this evidence, however, have caused considerable confusion
among attorneys,judges, and legal scholars. In this Article Professor
Imwinkelried posits a coherentstructurefor the correct analysisand application of FederalRules 702 and 703, which control the admissability
of scientific evidence
This analyticalframework clearly distinguishesthe expert's "major
premise"--his "scientific, technical,and other specialized knowledge"-from his "minor premise"--the case-specific information he uses to
draw his opinion or inference ProfessorImwinkelried explains that rule
702 regulatesthe majorpremise and rule 703 addresses the minorpremise. This Article also illustrateshow failing to recognize this distinction
can lead to the misinterpretationof these rules, impede theformulation
of sound policy regardingexpert witnesses, and cause litigatorsto overlook the weaknesses in scientific testimony offered by adverse witnesses.
Modem litigators use expert testimony extensively. At the beginning of this
decade the National Center for State Courts conducted a nationwide survey to
determine the 6xtent of the use of expert testimony, in particular the introduction of scientific evidence.1 The Center found that almost half of the attorneys2
responding encountered scientific testimony in roughly a third of their trials.
Medical testimony is commonplace in civil personal injury actions. In these actions judges routinely permit experts to testify on such issues as causation and
damages. In the criminal arena scientific proof has become "the backbone of
every circumstantial evidence case." 3 Prosecutors frequently call criminalists as
witnesses to testify about scientific techniques ranging from fingerprinting to
scanning electron microscopy. 4 In short, as one leading commentator has
t Professor of Law, University of California, at Davis; former Chair, Evidence Section,
American Association of Law Schools. The author would like to express his appreciation to Mr.
Ronald Richards, Class of 1989, School of Law, University of California, at Davis, who served as the
author's research assistant on this article.
1. Study to Investigate Use of Scientific Evidence, NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS REPORT, Sept., 1980, at 1.
2. Id.
3. Clark, Scientific Evidence, in THE PROSECUTOR'S DESKBOOK 542 (1971).
4. See generally P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE (1986) (overview
of the use of scientific evidence in criminal trials); A. MOENSSENS, F. INBAU & J. STARRS, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES (3d ed. 1986) (same).
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stressed, scientific testimony has "revolutionized the American lawsuit."'
In the final analysis we call testimony "scientific" because it is generated by
the distinctive scientific process. Scientific propositions and techniques are the
7
product of experimentation. 6 The scientist begins by postulating an hypothesis.
She next designs an experiment to verify or disprove the hypothesis 8 and then
conducts the experiment and attempts to correlate the experimental results with
the hypothesis. 9 The scientist accepts the hypothesis as a scientific truth only if
the experimental results validate the hypothesis.10 The essence of the scientific
process is, therefore, inductive reasoning. 1
Although scientific propositions are derived inductively, in the courtroom
scientific testimony is ordinarily presented in a deductive, syllogistic format.
The attorney calling a scientific witness typically wants the witness to apply a
scientific principle to some fact in the case to illuminate the significance of that
fact. 12 The witness evaluates the facts from the perspective of the general principle.1 3 Suppose, for instance, that a personal injury plaintiff calls a physician as
an expert on the issue of damages. The physician will rely, at least implicitly, on
a major premise. The physician's premise might be that a particular symptomatology (the presence of symptoms A, B, and C) proves the existence of brain
injury D. In the words of the most famous American scientific evidence case,
Frye v. United States, 14 the major premise is "the thing from which the [ex17
16
pert's] deduction is made."15 The major premise is a principle, procedure,
s
or explanatory theory derived by the inductive, scientific technique. The phy5. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REv. 577, 577
(1986).
6. See E. SNYDER, HISTORY OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES 21 (1969).

7. Moenssens, Admissibility ofScientific Evidence-An Alternative to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 545, 556 (1984).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. For another description of the scientific method, see Note, Social Science Statistics in
the Classroom: The DebateResurfaces in McCleskey v. Kemp, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 688, 69091 (1987).
11. See E. SNYDER, supra note 6, at 21.
12. An expert witness can play three different roles during a trial. R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF EVIDENCE 429 (2d ed. 1986). First,
the expert can serve purely as a fact witness. Id. Suppose, for example, that a physician had observed scratch marks on the chest of a person she was examining. The person in question is suspected of a rape, and the rape victim testifies that she scratched the rapist's chest during the attack.
The fact the marks exist is logically relevant in the case; their existence tends to corroborate the
complainant's testimony identifying the defendant as the rapist. If one assumes that the physicianpatient privilege does not bar the testimony, the physician could attest to the existence of the scratch
marks. The physician's status as an expert certainly should not preclude the physician from giving
the same factual testimony that a lay witness may give.
13. Id.
14. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
15. Id. at 1014.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163 (8th Cir.
1975); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
17. See, eg., United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019
(1975).
18. See, eg., United States v. Christopher, 833 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v.
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sician applies that major premise to the facts of the case, namely, plaintiff's case
history. The symptoms displayed by this specific plaintiff are the witness' minor
premise. That case history might show that plaintiff has experienced symptoms
A, B, and C. The result of applying the major to the minor premise is a conclusion, the witness' opinion on the merits of the case. In our hypothetical case,
given the expert's major premise, plaintiff's case history supports the opinion
that plaintiff suffers from brain injury D. Hence, the "path to the witness' final
opinion"'19 leads through the major and minor premises on which the expert
relies. In a broad sense of the term "basis," the expert's final opinion is "based"
on the major and minor premises. Those premises are the distinct, equally essential components of the syllogistic reasoning process yielding the ultimate
opinion.
Unfortunately, the literature on expert testimony repeatedly blurs the distinction between these two types of premises. More often than not articles about
scientific testimony are content with general references to the "bases" of the
testimony. Scholarly articles commonly make sweeping mention of the "bases"
of scientific testimony without differentiating between the major and minor
premise components. 20 Articles intended primarily for practitioners frequently
do likewise; again and again they employ the expression "bases" without distin21
guishing between the two very different kinds of bases for a scientific opinion.
The thesis of this Article is that it is imperative to draw a clear line between
the major and minor premise components of scientific testimony. The first section of this Article attempts to document the recurring failure of courts and
commentators to differentiate between the two types of premises. The second
section of the Article argues that neglecting to distinguish between the two types
of premises is fraught with danger. Specifically, it argues such failure can impede the formulation of sound policy governing the admissibility of expert testimony, result in the misconstruction of the Federal Rules of Evidence on expert
testimony, and cause litigators to overlook the real weaknesses in scientific testimony offered against their clients.
I.

THE REPEATED FAILURE OF COMMENTATORS AND COURTS TO
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE MAJOR AND MINOR PREMISE
COMPONENTS OF SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY

As previously observed, the literature on scientific testimony is replete with
vague, undifferentiated references to the "bases" of expert testimony. 22 That
Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164, 1169 n.3 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359, 362 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862 (1979); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d
1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973).
19. United States v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 416 F. Supp. 316, 325 (D.N.J. 1976).
20. E.g., McElhaney, Expert Witnesses and the FederalRules of Evidence, 28 MERCER L. REV.
463, 477 (1977); Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontierof Knowledge, 66 B.U.L. REv. 521, 526, 531 (1986).
21. E.g., McGrath, The Art of Advocacy Continues: Expert Witnesses, 12 THE DOCKET 1, 10
(1988); Rossi, Modern Evidence and the Expert Witness, LiTIGATION, Fall 1985, at 18, 65.
22. See supra notes 20-21.
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observation holds true in the case of many scholarly pieces by commentators on
evidentiary policy, opinions authored by judges construing the Federal Rules of
Evidence, and articles intended to give practical guidance on attacking expert
testimony in the courtroom.
A.

Commentaries on Evidentiary Policy

Many commentaries on evidentiary policy include general references to the
"bases" of expert testiinony,23 using the expression to include both the major
and minor premise components of scientific testimony. For example, in cataloguing the bases of expert testimony, one commentator lists "books, lectures,
medical reports, patient statements, [and] consultations." '24 In a similar vein,
while discussing the policies governing the admissibility of expert testimony, one
court stated that an expert may base an opinion on "reports from the patient,...
professional reports, treatises, and textbooks, ... and... examinations, tests and
diagnoses by other doctors." 25 Source materials such as books, lectures, treatises, and textbooks state the principles and theories which function as the expert's major premise. In contrast, statements by a patient and tests of the
patient by the other doctors furnish the witness with the minor premise; they
supply the data about the present case to which the expert applies the major
premise.
There is one particular setting in which the use of the undifferentiated term
"bases" is positively ludicrous. As Professor McElhaney has noted, courts often
26
assert that an expert cannot "base" his opinion on another expert's opinion.
This assertion is defensible in one narrow sense; the expert on the witness stand
should not be permitted to express an opinion solely because another expert
outside the courtroom has expressed the same opinion.2 7 Assume, for example,
that plaintiff calls Doctor A to testify about the plaintiff's diagnosis. It would be
silly to allow Doctor A to express the opinion that plaintiff has a particular
disease merely because Doctor B has opined to Doctor A that plaintiff suffers
from that disease. However, in the popular, broad sense of the term "bases," the
assertion is nonsense. As we have seen, commentators and courts often use the
term to include the expert's major premise. Does the assertion mean that a contemporary physicist cannot rely on the opinions of Albert Einstein? Does it
preclude a modern psychiatrist from considering the opinions of Sigmund
Freud? As Dickens' Mr. Bumble declared, "If the law supposes that....the law
28
is a[n] ...idiot .... ,,
Unless we are going to require the current generation of
scientists to reinvent the wheel, we must, and of course do permit them to em23. See supra note 20.
24. Blakey, An Introduction to the Oklahoma Evidence Code: The Thirty-Fourth HearsayException, 16 TULSA L.J. 1, 17 (1980) (quoting P. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE 82-83 (1973)).
25. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Dixon, 632 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
26. McElhaney, supranote 20, at 482-83; see also American Key Corp. v. Cole Nat'l Corp., 762
F.2d 1569, 1580 (1lth Cir. 1985) (expert in a federal antitrust case was not permitted to base his
testimony about relevant economic market on the opinions of others).
27. See State v. Towne, 142 Vt. 241, 453 A.2d 1133 (1982).
28. C. DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST (London, 1838).
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ploy their forerunners' theories and opinions as major premises for courtroom
testimony. In this context, a broad use of the term "bases" would lead to patently absurd results.
B. Analyses of the Constructionof FederalRules of Evidence 702 and 703
We have seen that commentaries on evidentiary policy frequently confuse
the major and minor premise cqmponents of scientific testimony. The same confusion surfaces in efforts to interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence controlling
the admissibility of expert testimony. The two statutes in point are rules 702
and 703. Rule 702 reads, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
29
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."1
Rule 703 provides,
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
30
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
As Section II of this Article will explain, rule 702, as properly construed,
regulates the scientist's major premise. Rule 703 addresses a different topic, the
sources the expert may consult in collecting the case-specific information to
serve as the minor premise. Sadly, rather than demarcating the boundaries between the two statutes, the literature on scientific testimony often succeeds only
in obscuring the distinction between rules 702 and 703.
One of the most publicized scientific evidence cases in recent years is Zenith
Radio Corporation v. Matsushita ElectricalIndustrial Co., 31 a mammoth antitrust suit against Japanese electronic products manufacturers. The litigation
generated several opinions. One opinion, authored by Judge Edward Becker,
was devoted entirely to the admissibility of a number of reports prepared by the
plaintiff's expert economists. 32 It was evident that article VII of the Federal
Rules governed the admissibility of the reports. However, even after surveying
the case law on rules 702 and 703, Judge Becker confessed that it was unclear
"whether the inquiry should proceed under F.R.E. 702 [or] 703.1' 33 The courts'
failure to define the relationship between rules 702 and 703 has had a predictable
result; whenever the court is in doubt as to which rule governs, it is likely to cite
both rules as the justification for a ruling.34 Treating the rules as interchangeable in this fashion hardly helps to demarcate the boundaries between them.
29. FED. R. EvID. 702.

30. Id. 703.
31. 505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. granted in part, 471 U.S. 1002 (1985), rev'd, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
32. Id. at 1318.
33. Id. at 1333 (Judge Becker also refers to FED. R. EVID. 403 in this context).
34. E.g., Moore v. Polish Power Inc., 720 S.W.2d 183, 192 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
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Rule 703 in particular has been abused. As Section II of this article will
demonstrate, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence intended rule 703 to
govern the content of the expert's minor premise. Commentators and courts,
however, have often cited the rule in situations in which the issue was the propriety of the witness' major premise. The celebrated American scientific evidence case, Frye v. United States,35 states that before the proponent may
introduce testimony based on a novel scientific technique, the proponent must
prove that the technique is already generally accepted within the relevant scientific specialty. 36 This doctrine is still the majority view in the United States. 37
Since the doctrine regulates the scientific techniques on which the witness may
rely, it relates to the witness' major premise. Yet, some leading commentators
analyze the viability of the Frye doctrine under rule 703.38 Still other commentators believe that rule 703 is dispositive of the question whether polygraph evidence is generally reliable enough to be admissible. 39 Rule 703 has also been
cited as the authority for allowing testifying doctors to refer to medical treatises
and journals. 40 The reliance on rule 703 in these situations is misplaced. In
each instance the expert would employ the data-the assumption of the general
reliability of polygraphy or of a technique discussed in a treatise or journal- as
part of her major premise. Like the commentaries noted above, many cases cite
rule 703 when the rule is inapposite. One court invoked rule 703 to support its
conclusion that the voice stress analysis technique was too untrustworthy to be
admissible.4 1 In another case the court rested its rejection of the expert's use of
a sun chart to determine dates based on altitude and azimuths, 42 squarely on
rule 703.43 In still another case, the expert attempted to base an opinion on a
"whole body of literature in the area of bio-mechanics." 44 The court allowed
the testimony to be admitted and premised its permission on rule 703.45 Numerous published opinions address the question whether an expert may rely on published scientific studies and reports, and in many of these cases, the courts
analyze the question under rule 703.46 In all of these cases the evidentiary issue
35. 293 F. 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence:
Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980).
36. P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 4, § 1-5.
37. P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 4, § 1-5.
38. M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 703.2 (2d ed. 1986); see also McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 888
(1982) ("rule 703 also may have some bearing on the issue of the Frye analysis").
39. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 633 (4th ed.
1986); Rossi, supra note 21, at 21.
40. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 39, at 669.
41. Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th Cir. 1984);
see also Socha, Excluding Plaintiff'sExpert Testimony, 29 FOR THE DEFENSE 24, 27 (Sept. 1987)
(discusses FED. R. EVID. 703 which permits reasonable reliance on certain kinds of evidence).
42. United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1981).
43. Id. at 755 n.10.
44. Mannino v. International Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 853 n.3 (6th Cir. 1981).
45. Id. at 852-53.
46. Osburn v. Anchor Laboratories, Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 915-16 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S.Ct. 1476 (1988); Higgins v. Kinnebrew Motors, Inc., 547 F.2d 1223, 1226 n.2 (5th Cir. 1977);
Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213, 222 (7th Cir. 1974). The converse problem arose in Washington v. Armstrong World Indus., 839 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1988). The court cited rule 703 in
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in dispute had nothing to do with the expert's minor premise, the specific facts of
the pending case; rather, the dispute revolved around the use of a technique or

information that could function as part of the major premise component of the
testifying scientist's reasoning process.
C Discussionsof Trial Tacticsfor Attacking Scientific Testimony
The failure to differentiate the scientist's two premises is also manifest in

practitioner articles discussing effective tactics for attacking scientific testimony
at trial. Most of these articles contain some excellent guidelines for cross- examining opposing experts, but these guidelines are incomplete. Many, if not most,
articles focus on attacks of one of the expert's premises to the exclusion of the

other.4 7
At one end of the spectrum are articles illustrating attacks on the expert's
minor premise while ignoring the possibility of challenging the expert's major

premise.4 8 These articles typically recommend that the cross-examiner concentrate the attack on vulnerable areas such as the expert's ignorance of specific
49
facts in the case or the expert's assumption of facts that can be disproven.

Although these articles sometimes cite rule 70250 they stop just short of pointing
out that the cross-examiner may also question the scientific technique or theory
that the expert is relying.

At the polar extreme are articles which contain detailed discussions of attacks on the witness' major premise but slight the topic of the minor premise. 5 '

These articles occasionally make passing references to the witness' assumptions
about the facts in the instant case,5 2 but their primary focus is the scientific

theory that the witness is applying to those facts. 53 The articles frequently discuss the use of standard scientific texts to impeach the witness' testimony about
the theory on which the witness relies;54 for example, the cross-examiner may
stressing that the expert's testimony was inadmissible if it is "unsupported by, medical literature."
Id. at 1123 (citing Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1982)).
47. Some comprehensive articles, however, touch on both topics. Eg., Rothblatt, Impeachment of Expert Testimony, in 1FORENSIC SCIE1CES ch. 10 (C. Wecht ed. 1981); Suplee & Woodruff,
Cross-Examination of Expert Witnesses, PRAC. LAW., Jan. 1988, at 41.
48. Eg., Baum, Taking on the Opposing Expert, TRIAL, Apr. 1984, at 74; Wolff, Cross-Examination of Experts, TRIAL, Mar. 1988, at 97.
49. Wolff, supranote 48, at 97 ("What information has he ignored that may lead to errors in his
testimony?"); Baum, supra note 48, at 78.
50. Baum, supra note 48, at 78.
51. Eg., Conason, Medical Cross-Examination-Refusalto Recognize Medical Authorities, in
143 ADVANCED NEGLIGENCE TRIAL STRATEGY 1979 165; Leahy, Examining, Cross-Examining
and Impeaching Expert Witnesses, in THE PROSECUTOR's DESKBOOK 455 (2d ed. 1977); Goldstein
& Sodaro, The Use of Medical Textbooks in Cross-examination of Medical Experts, 1955 MED.
TRIAL TECH. Q. 161; Evidence-Use of Learned Treatises, 25 DEF. L.J. 130 (1976); Expert Witnesses-Use of Texts and Treatises on Cross-Examination, 19 DEF. L.J. 686 (1970).
52. See, e.g., Leahy, supra note 51, at 478 (an expert may give an opinion on the basis of
"knowledge and observation" if the expert first testifies to the facts underlying the opinion, but much
expert testimony involves hypothetical responses to assumed facts).
53. See Leahy, supra note 51, at 479-84.
54. See Conason, supra note 51, at 169-71; Leahy, supra note 51, at 483 (American Psychiatric
Association's manual of definitions and statistics used to impeach a defense psychiatrist); Goldstein

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

force the witness to concede that the author of a leading text in the field rejects
the theory that the witness is employing as his major premise.
In some cases, however, as we shall see in more detail in Section II of this
Article, the minor premise should be the primary point of attack.5 5 A physician's major premise, the symptomatology for a particular illness, may be perfectly sound; there may even be unanimity in medical circles that the presence of
symptoms A, B, and C conclusively demonstrates the existence of illness D.
Assume, however, that the physician's sole source of information about the
plaintiff's case history is an interview with the plaintiff, conducted on the eve of
trial. Although the major premise is unassailable, the minor premise is suspect. 56 There is no corroboration for the information, the only source of information is an obviously biased person, and the expert conducted the interview
when the person's bias is likely to be most pronounced. Given the source and
timing of the interview, the witness' minor premise is vulnerable and may be the
key weakness that the opposing attorney should assail at trial.
II.

THE NEED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE MAJOR AND MINOR
PREMISE COMPONENTS OF SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY

Section I of this Article documented the widespread failure to distinguish
between the major and minor premises underlying scientific testimony. The confusion exists in the literature discussing evidentiary policy, the interpretation of
article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and trial tactics for attacking expert testimony. This section demonstrates that it is critical to distinguish between the two types of premises in each of these settings.
A. Evidentiary Policy
Differentiation between the scientist's major and minor premises is vital to
any discussion of the policies governing the admissibility of expert testimony.
The major and minor premises pose fundamentally different problems for the
policymaker.
There is a strong case for liberally allowing scientists to choose the general
theories and principles comprising their major premise even when doing so necessitates reliance on hearsay sources of information such as treatises written by
other scientists.57 As one court stated, it would be "virtually impossible" for a
& Sodaro, supra note 51, at 181-82; Evidence-Use of Learned Treatises, supra note 51, at 137;
Expert Witnesses-Use of Texts and Treatises on Cross-Examination,supra note 51, at 688.
55. See Rook, Take the High Ground: A PracticalApproach to Meeting the Insanity Defense, in
THE PROSECUTOR'S DESKBOOK, supra note 51, at 647-48.
56. See Tigar, Handling the Expert Like an Expert: Back to Basics, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 1, 1982,
at 21, 33.
57. "Hearsay" is used here in a broad nontechnical sense. Technically an out-of-court statement constitutes hearsay only if its proponent offers it in court for the truth of the assertion. FED. R.
EvID. 801(c). When the proponent calls a scientific witness who refers to another scientist's writings,
the reference may not constitute hearsay in the technical sense. The proponent might offer the
reference only for the limited purpose of helping the trier of fact understand the basis for the expert's
opinion. The judge could admit the statement with a limiting instruction. See FED. R. EVID. 105.

1988]

SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY

scientist to avoid relying on hearsay sources of information. 58 That observation
is an understatement. The reality is that "no scienti[st] ... can possibly have
firsthand knowledge of all the data comprising his field" 59 Any scientific testi-

mony invariably rests on such sources as the expert's college textbooks and the
lectures she has heard since graduation. 6° The witness has undoubtedly re-

viewed the published studies conducted by other scientists, and common sense
dictates that the witness be permitted to rely on those works even though the

witness did not participate directly in those studies. 61 It would be absurd to
limit the expert to scientific studies she had personally 'conducted. Would we

require a modem accident reconstruction expert to replicate Newton's seventeenth century experiments to derive the laws of motion?62 Suppose that a phys-

icist is testifying about the safety of a nuclear power plant. If the physicist
contemplates relying on the works of Fermi or Oppenheimer, would we require

that the physicist duplicate their research? 63 Imposing that requirement would

effectively bar all scientific testimony. To put the matter bluntly, permitting
scientific witnesses to consider the theories and studies of other researchers is an

absolute necessity.

4

Moreover, the witness' choice of theories and studies to employ as a major

premise should be afforded substantial deference. The scientific witness is an

65
expert precisely because he has intensively studied the literature in that field.

That study may be the witness' life work. 66 The witness' sphere of expertise 67
consists of mastery of the concepts, methodologies, principles, and theories pe-

culiar to the witness' scientific discipline. 68 The scientific witness knows "the

ways of his work" 69 better than the judge or jurors. In selecting a major prem-

ise, the witness acts in his capacity as a expert. Because the scientific witness has
58. Reeves v. Markle, 119 Ariz. 159, 162, 579 P.2d 1382, 1385 (1978) (en bane).
59. Dick, Hearsay Evidence in Expert Opinions, 8 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 378, 382 (1980).
60. See United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 954 (1972); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1322
(E.D. Pa. 1980); Moore v. Polish Power, Inc., 720 S.W.2d 183, 192 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); see also J.
SOPINKA & S. LEDERMAN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES 316 (1974) (Canadian courts
have recognized that "because an expert's knowledge is of others not before the court" there is a
hearsay basis for all expert opinion).
61. See Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1563-64 (N.D.Ill. 1983); see also
P. MCWILLIAMS, CANADIAN CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 241 (2d ed. 1984) (experts need not have personally conducted experiments to prove every hypothesis); Brown v. Colm, 11 Cal. 3d 639, 644, 522
P.2d 688, 690, 114 Cal. Rptr. 128, 130"(1974) ("there is no question that a professional physician
may rely upon medical texts as the basis for his testimony").
62. See, eg., E. SNYDER, supra note 6, at 38-39.
63. See, eg., E. SNYDER, supra note 6, at 97-98.
64. See Moore v. Grantham, 580 S.W.2d 142, 148 (rex. Ct. App. 1979), rev'd on other grounds,
599 S.W.2d 287 (rex. 1980).
65. FED. R. EVID. 702.
66. Moore v. Polish Power, Inc., 720 S.W.2d 183, 192 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980).
67. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1330 (E.D. Pa.
1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. grantedin part, 471 U.S. 1002
(1985), rev'd, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
68. See id. at 1328, 1364, 1370-71.
69. Id. at 1334 (citing Stem, Toward a Rationalefor the Use of Expert Testimony in Obscenity
Litigation, 20 CAE W. REs. L. REv. 527, 546 (1969)).
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unique, superior expertise in the field, the witness' choice of a major premise
warrants great respect.
When we turn to the witness' selection of information as a minor premise, a
radically different picture emerges. There is no absolute necessity to permit resort to hearsay sources, there is a much less compelling case for deference to the
witness' selection, and by its very nature the information serving as the minor
premise poses peculiar probative dangers at trial.
Necessity certainly does not mandate allowing the expert to rely on hearsay
sources to form the minor premise of her opinion. The traditional common-law
view was that the expert's knowledge of the specific facts of the pending case had
to take the form of personally observed facts or other independently admissible
evidence. 70 Thus, a physician could rely on symptoms he had observed and
medical records that fell within the business entry exception to the hearsay
rule.7 1 If, however, a hearsay report about the particular facts of the case did
not fall within a hearsay exception, the physician could not rely on that report as
part of the basis for his opinion. The traditional view, which held sway for
decades, required the proponent of the testimony to call the hearsay declarant as
a witness at trial thus allowing the primary care physician to describe oral reports from the toxicologist and the pathologist. The traditional view forced the
proponent of the physician's testimony to call the toxicologist and pathologist as
well. Critics of the traditional rule argued the rule was inconvenient,7 2 a criticism which had undeniable merit. Calling the additional witnesses perhaps
slightly enhanced the reliability of the testimony proffered at trial, but the critics
arguably were correct in concluding that the incremental benefit usually did not
justify the additional inconvenience to the witnesses and expenditure of court
time. Commentators, however, debated the issue in terms of relative convenience rather than true necessity. 73 Barring experts from resorting to hearsay
sources for their major premises would in effect render all scientific testimony
inadmissible. By contrast, because hearsay sources are not necessary to provide
the expert's minor premise, requiring that the information forming the minor
premise be independently admissible would not have the same drastic impact.
Further, there is much less reason to defer to the scientist's choice of the
information functioning as her minor premise. An expert's willingness to rely
on a report about the facts in the instant case is no guarantee of the report's
trustworthiness. 74 As an expert in medicine, a physician is in a better position
than the judge or jury to determine that the presence of symptoms A, B, and C is
the distinctive symptomatology for disease D. That determination is an exercise
70. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 15 (E. Cleary ed. 1984).

71. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).

72. See generally Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1962)
(criticizing as too restrictive current application of evidence rules and recommending more liberal
admission of expert medical testimony).
73. See, eg., Rheingold, supra note 72.
74. Note, HearsayBases of Psychiatric Opinion Testimony: A Critique of FederalRule of Evi-

dence 703, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 129 (1977).
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in scientific analysis. 7 5 Suppose, however, that symptom A is nausea, and the
patient tells the physician that she experienced nausea the day before visiting the
doctor's office. The patient is the plaintiff in a personal injury action, and the
question is whether plaintiff truthfully described her symptoms. Does the physiciari's medical degree make the physician a better judge of character than the
judge or jury? A physician's medical school coursework does not include any
specialized training in determining credibility. The determination of the content
of the expert's minor premise is predominantly an exercise in factual analysis
rather than true scientific analysis. 76 To make that determination, the expert
temporarily "step[s] into the shoes of the factfinder" at trial.7 7 We do not assign
that final determination to experts because the determination amounts to
"factfinding, not the application of expertise." 78 Empowering experts to finally
decide the facts constituting the minor premise would "usurp[ ] and derogate[ ]
79
the function of the factfinder."
Concededly, in some exceptional cases, the expert can determine the facts
constituting the minor premise more reliably than a lay trier of fact. Assume,
for example, that in the last hypothetical, during the consultation the patient
volunteers the fact that she experienced symptom E as well as symptoms A, B,
and C. That volunteered statement may lead the physician to question the patient's assertion that she experienced symptoms A, B, and C if the existence of
symptom E ordinarily precludes the presence of the other symptoms. Yet even
this situation does not prove that the expert is a superior factual analyst. In this
hypothetical the expert reaches a more trustworthy factual finding only because
of his knowledge of another relevant major premise; he is well enough informed
in his discipline's literature to realize that the presence of symptom E is an exclusionary diagnostic criterion for the other symptoms which the patient claims.
The key to the physician's factfinding is largely the major premise in a syllogistic
reasoning process: the presence of symptom E excludes the possibility that the
patient also experienced symptoms A, B, and C; this patient experienced symptom E and therefore the patient could not have simultaneously experienced
symptoms A, B, and C. Hence, even these exceptional cases bear out the generalization that a scientist's selection of principles for his major premise is entitled
to more deference than the same expert's attempt to reconstruct the particular
facts in the pending case The expert's reliance on inadmissible matter in the
minor premise creates probative dangers that are absent when the expert factors
hearsay information into the major premise. Suppose, for instance, that an accident reconstructionist uses some of the Newtonian laws of motion as a major
premise and testifies to that effect in the jury's hearing. The legitimate use of
that information will be evident to the jury. It will be clear to the jurors that the
75. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 595 F. Supp. 1313, 1345 (E.D. Pa.
1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), cert granted in part, 471 U.S. 1002
(1985), rev'd, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
76. Id. at 1342, 1345-46, 1349, 1368.

77. Id. at 1342.
78. Id. at 1368.
79. Id. at 1349.
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expert is not, at that point in his testimony, testifying about the specific facts in
this case; rather, the expert is explicitly discussing general scientific propositions.
Note, however, the danger that arises as soon as the accident reconstructionist
shifts topics and begins to discuss the minor premise. This discussion might
include the content of an oral statement of a bystander who purportedly witnessed the collision, or a statement by the police officer who investigated the
accident. There is a good possibility that neither statement would be independently admissible. If the bystander made the statement calmly long after the
accident, his statement would not qualify as an excited utterance 80 or a present
sense impression s ' and would be inadmissible.8 2 If the police officer lacked personal knowledge of the manner in which the collision occurred, his statement
also would be inadmissible.8 3 If the statements are admissible, a problem arises
because the expert's discussion of her minor premise may relate to the very adjudicative facts that the jury must determine.8 4 Plaintiff's complaint might allege
that defendant was negligently speeding, and the bystander's or police officer's
statement might assert that the defendant exceeded the speed limit. A similar
problem arises in a run-of-the-mill personal injury case in which the plaintiff
presents expert medical testimony, because some of the matter included in the
expert's minor premise will predictably coincide with the disputed adjudicative
facts. One of those facts is usually how the accident causing the injuries occurred; the force of the impact between the two colliding cars may be one of the
pivotal issues determining liability in the case. The manner of causation, however, is also often diagnostically relevant, and consequently the physician may
include a hearsay description of the force of impact in his minor premise. In
these cases, even if the judge admits the information only for the limited purpose
of showing the basis of the expert's opinion and gives the jury an appropriate
limiting instruction, 5 there is a grave risk that the jury will misuse the information as evidence on the historical merits of the case. The line drawn by the
limiting instruction may be too fine for the lay jurors to understand.8 6 The latest
empirical research on the efficacy of limiting instructions casts doubt upon juror's ability to follow the instructions.8 7 As a result, inadmissible evidence inay
be "insinuate[d]" into the jury's deliberations.8 8 That danger is a recognized
80. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
81. See id. 803(l).
82. See id. 802.
83. See id. 602.
84. For a discussion of the difference between adjudicative and legislative facts, see FED. R.
EvID. 201 advisory committee's note.
85. FED. R. EviD. 105.
86. See Carlson, supra note 5, at 584; see also Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony:
Limitations on Affirmative Introduction of Underlying Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 234, 235 (1984)
(admission of third party reports "blur[s] the distinction" between basis of opinion and substantive
evidence).
87. Marcotte, 'The Jury WillDisregard.. .', 73 A.B.A. J. 34-35 (Nov. 1, 1987) (research conducted under the auspices of the American Bar Foundation); Allen, When Jurors Are Ordered to
Ignore Testimony, They Ignore the Order, Wall. St. J., Jan. 25, 1988, § 2, at 33, col. 4 (study by
American Bar Foundation and Northwestern University).
88. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1334, 1341 (E.D.
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ground for excluding evidence both at common law8 9 and under the Federal
Rules. 90 By contrast, the matter contained in the witness' major premise rarely
relates to the controverted adjudicative facts in the case and, hence, is not subject to that ground for exclusion. This danger associated with admitting evidence constituting the minor as opposed to the major premises is a further policy
reason for treating the premises differently.
In Zenith Radio Corporation v. MatsushitaElectric IndustrialCo.9 1 the defense sensed the difference between major and minor premises. The defense vigorously attacked plaintiff's expert reports that contained detailed discussions of
the adjudicative factual disputes and purported to apply economic expertise to
resolve the disputes. 92 Plaintiff, however, offered "economic treatises, studies,
and articles" in addition to those reports. 93 The defense did not challenge in any
way the right of plaintiff's experts to rely on the treatises, studies, and articles. 94
In his opinion, Judge Becker not only noted the defense's failure to challenge
this scientific literature but added the defense could not have mounted a successful challenge. Judge Becker declared it was plainly legitimate for a scientist to
rely on that type of literature to support an expert opinion. 95 In sum, in the
Zenith Radio litigation both the defense and the judge acknowledged the distinction between the major and minor premise components of the reasoning by
plaintiff's experts. The recognition of that distinction facilitated an intelligent
ruling on the admissibility of the challenged reports. The realization of that
distinction is essential to the formulation of sound evidentiary policy governing
96
the permissible bases of scientific testimony.
B.

Statutory Interpretation

In Zenith Radio, Judge Becker bemoaned the fact that the case law has not
clarified the relationship between Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703.97
This Article submits that the distinction between the scientist's major and minor
premises is the key to defining that relationship. Simply stated, rule 702 should
be construed as governing the expert's major premise while rule 703 has a disPa. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. grantedin part, 471 U.S.
1002 (1985), rev'd, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
89. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 70, § 15.
90. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
91. 505 F.Supp. 1313.

92. Id. at 1324-25, 1338.
93. Id. at 1324.
94. Id. at 1324, 1337.
95. Id.
96. See Osburn v. Anchor Laboratories, Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 915 (5th Cir. 1987) ("scientific
studies and case histories reported in generally accepted medical literature"), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1476 (1988); Manko v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 1419, 1425-26 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (epidemiological
data); Prechtel v. Gonse, 396 N.W.2d 837, 838-39 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (a study titled "The Dollar
Value of Household Work"); see also Dore, A ProposedStandardfor Evaluating the Use ofEpidemiological Evidence in Toxic Tort and other PersonalInjury Cases, 28 How. L.J. 677, 692-98 (only
highly significant statistical evidence should be admitted).
97. Zenith Radio, 505 F. Supp. at 1333.
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tinct mission, namely, determining the type of information that the expert may
factor into his minor premise.
1. The Proper Construction of Rule 702
It is a well-settled maxim of statutory construction that an interpretation
that gives independent effect to each part of a statute is preferred over an interpretation that would render part of the statute superfluous. 98 We normally presume that the legislature does not perform useless acts. 99 It would be a useless
act for the legislature to include meaningless language in a statute. °0 For that
reason, the maxim has evolved that in construing statutes, courts should attempt
to find a reasonable interpretation giving effect to each part of an individual
statute and each statute within a statutory scheme.10 1 In light of this maxim,
the text, context, and legislative history of rule 702 point to the conclusion that
the rule governs the permissible major premises for scientific testimony. The
main clause of rule 702--"a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise" 102-controls the question of whether the witness qualifies as an
expert. However, the application of the independent effect maxim leads to the
conclusion that the rule also governs the separate issue of the permissible major
premises on which the expert may rely. If the sole function of rule 702 were to
prescribe the qualification standard for experts, the introductory dependent
clause which allows such testimony "[i]f scientific ...knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" 10 3 would
be surplusage. The only way to give effect to the introductory clause is to assume that the clause serves an additional function. 1° 4 As several commentators
have observed, the wording of the clause strongly suggests that its distinctive
province is to regulate the subjects and theories about which the expert may
testify.10 5 The Michigan version of rule 702 makes that suggestion even
stronger. The Michigan draftsmen reworded the introductory clause to read:
"If the court determined that recognized scientific, technical, or other special98. 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, at 104 (N.
Singer 4th ed. 1984).
99. Id.at 107 n.1 (citing Kish v. Montana State Prison, 161 Mont. 297, 301, 505 P.2d 891, 893
(1973)).
100. Id. at 109 n.4 (citing Robison v. Ray, 637 P.2d 108, 110 (Okla. 1981)).
101. Id. at 108 n.1 (citing Western Wash. Cement Masons Health & Sec. Trust Funds v. Hillis
Homes, Inc., 26 Wash. App. 224, 232, 612 P.2d 436, 441 (1980)); see also McCuin v. Secretary of
Health and Human Services, 817 F.2d 161, 169-71 (1st Cir. 1987) (regulation interpreted to preserve
some meaning in accompanying regulation).
102. FED. R. EvID. 702.
103. Id.
104. See People v. Wesley, 198 Cal. App. 3d 519, 522, 243 Cal. Rptr. 785, 786 (1988) (a construction which renders part of the statute surplusage should be avoided).
105. See, e.g., M. GRAHAM, supra note 38, §§ 702.1, 702.4; 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 380, 382-83 (1979); 3 J.WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, at 702[02]-[03]; Carlson, supra note 5, at 582; Harty, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Under the Iowa Rules of Evidence: Proffering and Resisting Expert Opinion, 36 DRAKE L.
REv. 345, 350 (1986-87); Romero, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under the New Mexico
and FederalRules of Evidence, 6 N.M.L. Rlv. 187, 198 (1976); Rossi, supra note 21, at 18-19;
Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV.473, 477-78 (1986).
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ized knowledge will assist the trier of fact ....1"106 The addition of the adjective
"recognized" was patently calculated to limit the types of scientific theories and

techniques that the expert could employ as a major premise. The draftsmen's
decision to insert that adjective in rule 702 rather than in another statute such as

703 reflects their conclusion that 702 prescribes the restrictions on the expert's
major premise.

The context of rule 702 bolsters that conclusion. The context of rule 702
includes all other parts of the same statutory scheme.1 0 7 As sections of the same
evidence code, rules 702 and 703 are in pari materia108 and should be construed
together. The independent-effect maxim comes into play again; an ideal cumula-

tive10 9 construction would give each statute independent significance. 110 On its
face, rule 703 governs "[tihe facts or data in the particular case upon which an

expert bases an opinion." ' II A plausible, narrow interpretation of rule 703 is

that the quoted language refers only to the witness' minor premise. The in-

dependent-effect maxim cuts in favor of that narrow interpretation. As Section I
of this Article noted, some courts and commentators read rule 703 broadly as

applying to both the witness' major and minor premises. However, a broad interpretation of rule 703 strains the independent-effect maxim and blurs the lines
between rules 702 and 703; under that interpretation, rule 703 and the introductory clause of 702 overlap as restrictions on the expert's major premise. In contrast, the narrow interpretation eliminates any possibility of duplication and

conflict between the two rules.
Like its text and context, the legislative history of rule 702 supports the

conclusion that the draftsmen intended the rule to regulate the content of the
expert's major premise. It is true that the fourth and final paragraph of the

Advisory Committee Note to rule 702 mentions the test for determining whether
a witness qualifies as an expert.11 2 The bulk of the note, however, discusses the
tests to determine what subjects are proper for expert testimony. For example,
the third paragraph states that rule 702 furnishes an answer to the question
106. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 105, 1 702[06] (quoting MICH. R. EVID. 702).
107. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 98, at ch. 51; see also American Min.Congress v. U.S.
E.P.A., 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[a] statutory provision cannot properly be torn from the
law of which it is a part"); United States v. Vest, 639 F. Supp. 899 (D. Mass. 1986) (when reading
text of statute, court must read not only a particular provision but other provisions that are part of
its context); Yoffie v. Marin Hosp. Dist., 193 Cal. App. 3d 743, 238 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1987) ("Every
statute must be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part."), aff'd,
813 F.2d 477 (1987); In re Marriage of Norvall, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1047, 237 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1987)
(various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause in
context of the statutory framework as a whole); Sonoma Subaru v. New Motor Vehicle Bd., 189 Cal.
App. 3d 13, 234 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1987) (statute should be construed with reference to entire statutory
scheme to achieve harmony among its parts); Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, 181
Cal. App. 3d 245, 226 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1986) (statutes are to be construed with reference to the entire
system of law of which they are a part).
108. See In re Johnson, 787 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1986); Burk v. Unified School Dist.,
Wabaunsee County, 646 F. Supp. 1557, 1563 (D. Kan. 1986).
109. See Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated, 107 S.
Ct. 3203 (1987).
110. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 661 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (N.D. Iowa 1987).
111.FED. R. EVID. 703.
112. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
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"[w]hether the situation is a proper one for the use of expert testimony." ' 13 In
addition, one of the early sentences in the fourth paragraph asserts that the rule
governs "the fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon." 114 After stating
that rule 702 progressively allows resort to any helpful, specialized field of
knowledge, the fourth paragraph adds that the rule "similarly" announces a liberal test for expert qualification. 115 The use of the adverb "similarly" indicates
the Committee believed rule 702 serves twin functions: the rule not only determines who qualifies as an expert but also controls the subjects on which a qualified expert may testify.
2. The Proper Construction of Rule 703
Turning to rule 703, the conclusion is that rule is designed to govern only
the witness' minor premise, the information about the specific facts in the pending case. The text, context, legislative history, and purpose of the rule all are
consistent with that interpretation.
The first words of the text of the rule are "[t]he facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion."'1 16 The phrase "in the particular case" implies that the rule is limited to the information comprising the
witness' minor premise. By definition, the expert's minor premise is the data in
the particular case to which the expert applies the scientific theory or technique.
The context of rule 703 likewise favors a construction of the rule confined
to the minor premise. As previously demonstrated, that narrow interpretation
of rule 703 helps harmonize the rule with rule 702.117 Rules 702 and 703 are
interrelated parts of the same statutory scheme.' 18 As such, they should be reconciled. 119 Reading rule 702 as controlling the witness' major premise while
applying rule 703 to the minor premise is the most complete reconciliation, since
that interpretation precludes any possible conflict between the two statutes.
Although the contextual argument based on rule 702 is attractive, an even
more potent argument can be constructed on the basis of rule 705. That rule
reads,
The expert may testify in terms of opinion.., and give his reasons
therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. 703.
117. See McCuin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 817 F.2d 161, 168 (1st Cir. 1987);
In re Johnson, 787 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1986); Yoffie v. Main Hosp. Dist., 193 Cal. App. 3d
743, 748, 238 Cal. Rptr. 502, 504 (1987); In re Marriage of Norvall, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1047, 1055,
237 Cal. Rptr. 770, 774 (1987); Sonoma Subaru v. New Motor Vehicle Bd., 189 Cal. App. 3d 13, 20,
234 Cal. Rptr. 226, 230 (1987); Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, 183 Cal. App. 3d
245, 269, 226 Cal. Rptr. 361, 372 (1986); People v. Garcia, 187 Cal. App. 3d 887, 895, 223 Cal. Rptr.
884, 888 (1986).
118. See Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir. 1986) (Securities
Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are interrelated and are to be given cumulative

construction).
119. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 661 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (N.D. Iowa 1987); Ohio

Farmers Ins. Co. v. Quin, 198 Cal. App. 3d. 1338, 1348, 244 Cal. Rptr. 359, 365 (1988).
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the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required
to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. 120
One striking feature of rule 705 is that it uses the language "the ... facts or
data"-the same language which appears at the beginning of rule 703. When
the legislature uses identical language in different statutes, the normal assumption is that the legislature used the language in the same sense in both statutes. 12 1 On that assumption, the wording of rule 705 makes the conclusion
virtually unavoidable that rule 703 is confined to the expert's minor premise.
The first sentence of rule 705 allows the expert on direct examination to state an
"opinion... and [the] reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data."' 122 The rule's wording necessarily assumes that the "reasons"
for the opinion differ from "the underlying facts or data"; otherwise, it would be
impossible for the expert to reveal her reasons on direct examination without
disclosing the underlying facts and data. The broad interpretation of rule 703,
which applies the rule to the expert's major premise, would reduce rule 705 to
nonsense. Other than the expert's opinion itself, the only components of the
expert's reasoning process are the major and minor premises. If the expression
"facts or data" in rule 703 subsumes both premises, under rule 705 it would be
impossible to state the "reasons" for the opinion without revealing "the underlying facts or data." Assuming that "facts or data" include both premises and
that the expert can withhold the "facts or data" on direct examination, there can
be no remaining "reasons" to reveal. The only sensible result is to interpret
"reasons" as referring to the witness' major premise and "facts or data" as the
minor premise. Therefore, on direct examination, a physician could testify that
he has diagnosed the patient as suffering from illness D and that his reason for
the diagnosis is the major premise that the presence of symptoms A, B, and C is
diagnostic for illness D. Under rule 705, the physician could give that direct
testimony without going into any detail about his minor premise, the oral hearsay reports and medical records which led him to believe that this specific plaintiff has experienced symptoms A, B, and C.
The Advisory Committee Note to rule 703 lends further support to the
contention that 703 applies only to the expert's minor premise. The first paragraph of the note illustrates the types of information that fall within the meaning
of the expression "facts or data." 123 The paragraph lists "statements by patients
and relatives, reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and other doctors,
hospital records, and X rays."' 124 These are the only examples furnished in the
note. 125 The common characteristic of all the listed examples is that they would
serve as part of the expert's minor premise. These sources of information would
120. FED. R. EvID. 705.
121. Barnson v. United States, 816 F.2d 549, 554 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 229 (1987);
Doctors Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 1448, 1452 (11th Cir. 1987); Altaville Drug Store, Inc. v.
California Employment Dev. Dept., 234 Cal. Rptr. 78, 82 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 242 Cal.
Rptr. 732, 44 Cal. 3d 231, 746 P.2d 871 (1988).
122. FED. R. EVID. 705.
123. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
124. Id.
125. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1322-23 (E.D.
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supply the specific facts of the particular case, but none of the listed sources
constitutes a scientific theory or technique to be used to evaluate those facts.

Thus, the note is still another clue suggesting that rule 703 governs only the
126
information comprising the expert's minor premise.

The final clue is the indication in the note that the principal purpose of
enacting rule 703 was to liberalize the permissible bases for expert opinion testimony. The first paragraph of the note avows an intent to "broaden the basis of
expert opinions beyond that current in many jurisdictions."' 127 The third paragraph of the note predicts that the rule will "enlarge" the permissible bases for

expert opinions.1 28 Seizing on these passages, commentators have universally
concluded that the basic thrust of rule 703 is to relax the admissibility standards

for expert testimony.1 29 However, if rule 703 is construed as governing the witness' major as well as minor premise, that construction would frustrate the rule's
purpose and actually make admissibility standards in expert testimony more
stringent.
At the time of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the over-

whelming majority of jurisdictions subscribed to the Frye standard for determining the admissibility of scientific testimony. 130 Frye was the controlling test in at
least forty-five states. 13 ' Under the Frye rule, testimony based on a scientific

Pa. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. granted in part, 471 U.S.
1002 (1985), rev'd, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
126. At first blush, the last paragraph of the note appears to muddy the waters. That paragraph
states,
If it be feared that enlargement of permissible data may tend to break down the rules of
exclusion unduly, notice should be taken that the rule requires that the facts or data "be of
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." The language would not
warrant admitting in evidence the opinion of an "accidentologist" as to the point of impact
in an automobile collision based on statements by bystanders, since this requirement is not
satisfied.
FED R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note. As Judge Becker has remarked, this paragraph in the
note unfortunately can lead to "confusion between Rules 702 and 703." Zenith Radio, 505 F. Supp.
at 1327 n.14a. The proponent of a broad interpretation of rule 703 might argue that the last paragraph of the note proves that the rule also applies to the expert's major premise; the paragraph seems
to generally allow the judge to exclude unreliable accident reconstruction testimony.
The paragraph, however, is susceptible to a more limited- and more sensible-interpretation.
The admissibility of accident reconstruction testimony has been established beyond any cavil, See

generally R.

LIMPERT, MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION AND CAUSE ANALYSIS

(2d

ed. 1984) (aid to trial lawyer's understanding and use of accident reconstruction testimony). The
paragraph cannot be read as a blanket bar to the admission of accident reconstruction testimony. A
close reading of the paragraph shows that the note requires the exclusion of the expert's testimony
only when the expert rests the opinion "on statements of bystanders." FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory
committee's note. However, that type of statement is a classic example of information that would
function as the witness' minor premise. The bystander is undoubtedly not going to make any assertions about the laws of motion; rather, the bystander will be making assertions about the speed and
movement of the automobiles-the specific facts in the instant case.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. E.g., 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supranote 105, § 389, at 655, 658; 3 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra note 105, 703[03]; Blakey, supra note 24, at 5.
130. Imwinkelried, The Standardfor Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critiquefrom the Perspec.
tive ofJurorPsychology, 28 VILL. L. REv. 554, 556-57 (1983).
131. Note, Changing the Standardfor the Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: State v.
Williams, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 757, 769 (1979).
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technique was admissible if the technique was generally accepted within the relevant scientific circle. 132
The acceptance of the testimony within the scientific circle virtually ensured the admissibility of the evidence. Against this backdrop, Congress enacted
the Federal Rules, including rule 703. Rule 703 permits an expert to base an
opinion on information only "[i]f [it is] of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field."' 133 At least one line of authority holds that by
virtue of the rule's use of the term "reasonably," the judge may bar an expert
from relying on a type of information even when it is the customary practice
within the expert's specialty to rely on that type of data, if the judge finds that
reliance objectively unreasonable. 134 If that interpretation of rule 703 is correct,1 35 rule 703's application to the expert's major premise could result in a
more conservative test for admissibility than the Frye standard; even when the
proponent of the testimony can prove general acceptance, the judge could second-guess the scientific community and bar the testimony.
Rule 703 will have its intended liberalizing impact only if its application is
limited to the witness' minor premise. Before the adoption of the Federal Rules,
many jurisdictions flatly refused to permit experts to include independently
inadmissible information in their minor premise. 136 The last sentence of rule
703 states a general proposition that "the facts or data" the expert relies on
"need not be admissible in evidence."' 137 As the preceding paragraph noted, this
general proposition is qualified by the judge's ability to preclude reliance on a
particular type of information when the judge concludes that the type of information in question cannot "reasonably [be] relied upon." 13 8 Even with this
qualification, rule 703 is a more liberal admissibility standard than the commonlaw test. Under the common-law standard experts could never rely on independently inadmissible matter, while rule 703 generally permits them to rely on
such information except when it falls within the qualification. Hence, rule 703
represents a liberalization of admissibility standards only if the scope of the rule
is confined to the expert's minor premise. The draftsmen of rule 703 unmistakably intended the rule to have a liberalizing effect. That intent strengthens interpretation of rule 703 as applying only to the information constituting the
witness' minor premise.
B. Attacking the Weight of Opposing Scientific Testimony at Trial
We have seen that it is imperative for evidentiary policymakers and judges
132. See generally Giannelli, supra note 35, at 1197 (criticizing the Frye rule and discussing
various alternatives).
133. FED. R. EVID. 703,.

134. E.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1243-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988).
135. Contra In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 275-79 (3d Cir. 1983)
rev'd, 475 U.S. 574 (1986)..
136. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 70, § 15.
137. FED. R. EVID. 703.
138. Id.
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construing Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703 to distinguish between the
scientific witness' major and minor premises. The distinction is helpful to
policymakers formulating admissibility standards and judges applying them.
Trial attorneys must also be cognizant of the distinction. Section I of this Article noted that practitioner articles on the impeachment of expert testimony usually focus on one premise to the exclusion of the other. If the litigator does
likewise, she may overlook the real weakness of the opposing scientific testimony, and a weakness in the testimony may go undetected at trial. If the litigator, however, is conscious of the distinction between the major and minor
premises, she may more easily identify the most effective attack on the weight of
the opposing testimony. Two of the most famous scientific cases of this era are
illustrative.
The first case is United States v. Stifel.' 39 Stifel is the leading decision
championing the admissibility of neutron activation analysis (NAA) evidence.14° NAA "is one of the most sophisticated scientific techniques... used
in" litigation. 141 The technique is powerful because it is extremely sensitive:
"Detection limits are in the microgram and nanogram range. Consequently,
minute samples such as a single hair or a paint chip can be analyzed."' 14 2 In
Stifel, a murder case, the prosecution used the NAA technique to make a minute
measurement of bomb debris. The prosecution alleged defendant had sent the
victim the bomb through the mail. The bomb exploded when the victim opened
the package.
The bomb debris included remains of the package's mailing label, cardboard mailing tube, metal cap, and tape. An NAA expert analyzed the debris
and compared the debris to similar materials found in the Proctor & Gamble
storeroom where the defendant worked.' 43 The expert found identical minute
quantities of several chemical elements in the debris and storeroom samples. At
trial the expert testified that "the mailing label and the cardboard tube fragments were of the same 'elemental composition' as their Proctor & Gamble
counterparts and that 'within reasonable scientific certainty' they were 'of the
same type and same manufacture.' "44 At trial and on appeal, the defense
4
attacked this testimony.1
The appellate court rejected the defense's attacks. Later cases have read the
appellate court's opinion as endorsing the view that "identification by Neutron
Activation Analysis of small particles of physical evidence is possible and highly
accurate."' 146 However, as one of the most perceptive commentaries on the Sti139. 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). For a discussion of Stfel
and other cases permitting NAA evidence, see A. MOENSSENS, F. INBAU & J. STARRS,supra note 4,
§ 9.07, at 540-41.
140. A. MOENSSENS, F. INBAU & J. STARRS, supra note 4, § 9.07, at 540-41.
141. P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 4, § 11-1, at 329.
142. P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 4, § 11-1, at 329.
143. Stifel, 433 F.2d at 436.
144. Id. at 436.
145. Id. at 435-36.
146. A. MOENSSENS, F. INBAU & J. STARRS, supra note 4, § 9.07, at 540.
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fel decision points out, 14 7 both the defense and court arguably overlooked the
real weakness in the prosecution expert's testimony: the weakness in one of the
expert's major premises.
The court and defense in Stifel correctly identified one major premise used
by the prosecution expert: NAA is capable of determining the elemental composition of unknown substances. On appeal, the court analyzed that major premise. 14 8 However, as the commentator mentioned above has noted, the
prosecution expert employed another line of classic syllogistic reasoning which
the court and defense largely overlooked: when NAA shows that two samples
have the same minute concentrations of chemical elements, the samples probably have the same source; the NAA of these samples shows that they possess
identical trace concentrations of elements; and consequently, the two samples
likely have the same source-namely, the storeroom to which the defendant had
access. 149 This is the syllogistic reasoning which the defense should have challenged. Even more to the point, the defense should have challenged the major
premise in this line of reasoning. The minor premise, that NAA has the capacity to determine whether two samples have the same minute quantities of chemical elements, is sound.150 The major premise, however, is unproven. It may be
that samples drawn from different sources can have the same elemental composition; the only way to demonstrate the validity of the major premise is to conduct
empirical studies showing that samples with different origins will have different
trace concentrations of elements. 15 1 At trial the most effective attack on this
testimony would have been questioning the major premise-for instance, forcing
the prosecution expert on cross-examination to admit that there had been no
empirical studies. The weakness in the expert testimony in Stifel was hidden in
the major premise. Given the state of the empirical research at the time of Stifel,
the expert should have been permitted to testify, at most, that the samples possessed the same minute concentrations of elements and that they could have a
common origin or source.1 52 However, that fallacy evidently went undetected at
trial; neither the court nor the defense carefully scrutinized the expert's major
premise.
In an equally famous case, the weakness in the scientific testimony was buried in the expert's minor premise. Just as Stifel is a leading precedent on the
admissibility of NAA, United States v. Hiss153 is one of the pioneering decisions
analyzing the use of expert psychiatric testimony for impeachment. The Hiss
prosecution was a cause celebre-the prosecution of Alger Hiss on espionage
charges. The star prosecution witness was Whittaker Chambers. The defense
called a psychiatrist, Dr. Binger, to impeach Chambers. The defense expert tes147.
(1971).
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, 59 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1070
Stifel, 433 F.2d at 436.
Comment, supra note 147,
A. MOENSSENS, F. INBAU
Comment, supra note 147,
Comment, supra note 147,
88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y.

at 1020-25.
& J. STARRS, supra note 4, § 9.05.
at 1023.
at 1024.
1950).
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tified that Chambers had a psychopathic personality disposed to making false
accusations.1 54 The expert rested his opinion, in part, on Chambers' behavior in
the courtroom 155-such as the fact that Chambers often gazed at the ceiling
during his testimony. 156 The prosecution was so highly publicized and the expert testimony so dramatic that "all discussions of the use of psychiatric testimony dwell at length on the Hiss trial, and the case has been hailed as the dawn
157
of a new era."
Much of the debate over Hiss centers on the major premise that merely by
observing a person's demeanor, a mental health expert can accurately determine
whether the person is testifying truthfully. 158 The most questionable feature of
the testimony in Hiss was the expert's minor premise; the expert included in his
minor premise information gathered only by brief, courtroom observation rather
1 60
It is arguthan by clinical examination.1 5 9 A clinical evaluation is optimum.
able that even a diagnosis based on courtroom observation assists the jury
enough to pass to qualify as admissible, 16 1 but the weight of a diagnosis resting
on courtroom behavior is certainly doubtful. 162 The courtroom is a stressful,
artificial environment for the witness, and the witness' conduct in the courtroom
may not typify the witness' normal behavior. Some experts flatly deny that an
accurate diagnosis can be based on courtroom observation, 163 and there is a
broad consensus that observing the witness at trial is an inferior basis for an
expert opinion. 164 The weight of an opinion based on "superficial courtroom
observation," 165 is subject to "grave doubts." 166 With the cross-examination
misdirected in this matter, Hiss is the mirror image of Stifel; in Stifel, the attack
should have centered on the expert's major premise, while in Hiss the primary
target should have been the low caliber of the information included in the expert's minor premise. In both cases, a realization of the distinction between the
expert's major and minor premises might have resulted in more telling attacks
on the weight of the expert testimony at trial.

III. CONCLUSION
The Judicial Conference's Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
154. Id. at 566; 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 105, 607[04].
155. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 105, 1 607[04].
156. See Slovenko, Witnesses, Psychiatryand the Credibilityof Testimony, 19 U. FLA. L. REv. 1,
11(1966).
157. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 105, 1 607[04], at 607-72, -73.
158. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 105, 607[04], at 607-74,-75,-76.
159. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 105, 607(04], at 607-75.
160. Note, Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 YALE L.J. 1324, 1336
(1950).
161. Id.
162. See generally Recent Case, Evidence-CourtroomPsychiatricDiagnosis- Valid or Invalid?,
30 NEB. L. REv. 513 (1951) (consensus of the psychiatric profession is that courtroom observation

alone is
163.
164.
165.
166.

insufficient for accurate analysis).
See id. at 515 n.l1.
Id. at 515-16.
Id. at 516.
Id.

1988]

SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY

released the Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States District Courts and Magistrates in 1969.167 That draft contained proposed rules 702 and 703,168 which are virtually identical to the current rules 702
and 703. Since then, we have had almost two decades of experience working
with rules 702 and 703. Yet, as Judge Becker has noted, to date the courts have
failed to clarify the relationship between the two statutes.1 69 That failure is intolerable. Scientific testimony is one of the most commonly used types of evi-

dence in modem litigation. Article VII of the Federal Rules is supposed to
furnish guidance to litigators on the use of expert testimony. Rules 702 and 703

are not only the first article VII provisions dealing with expert testimony; they
are also the two most important parts of the statutory scheme for regulating the

admissibility of expert testimony. Given the length of the time we have had to
study article VII, the uncertainty surrounding rules 702 and 703 is inexcusable.
To end that uncertainty, this Article proposes drawing a relatively sharp
line 170 between the major and minor premise components of expert witnesses'
reasoning. On one side of the line are such questions as whether the topic is
appropriate for expert testimony and whether the expert can consider scientific
treatises and studies. Those questions relate to the soundness of the witness'

major premise. To answer those questions the courts should look to rule 702
and the general provisions of the Federal Rules such as rules 403171 and 901.172
167. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES (1969).

168. Id. at 142-43.
169. Zenith Radio, 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part,rev'd in part,723 F.2d
238 (3d Cir. 1983), cerL granted in part,471 U.S. 1002 (1985), rev'd, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
170. It would be wrong to claim that it will always be easy to determine whether information
relates to an expert witness' major or minor premise. Consider, for example, Norris v. Gatts, 738
P.2d 344 (Alaska 1987). In Norris plaintiff brought suit for personal injuries he sustained when
defendant's automobile struck his motorcycle. Id. at 346. Defendant was driving an Audi 5000, and
she claimed that just before impact, her car accelerated out of control. Id. To support the claim the
defense called an engineering expert who testified that the Audi 5000 had a design defect that could
cause unanticipated, unwanted acceleration. Id. at 346-47. In forming his opinion the expert considered 128 consumer complaints of unwanted acceleration incidents involving the Audi 5000 that had
been submitted to the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration and the Center for
Auto Safety. Id. at 347. The court invoked rule 703 to decide whether it was proper for the expert
to rely on the consumer complaints. Id. at 349. However, on the facts of Norris,is it clear that the
complaints are part of the witness' minor premise?
171. FED. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 reads, "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading of the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence." Id.
Rule 403 has almost universal application. Dolan, Rule 403: The PrejudiceRule in Evidence,
49 S. CAL. L. REV. 220, 269 (1976). The rule "apparently cuts across the entire body of the Rules,"
Rothstein, Some Themes in the ProposedFederalRules of Evidence, 33 FED. B.J. 21, 29 (1974), and
"every rule of admissibility [is] subject to the power of discretionary exclusion" under rule 403. 22
C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5213, at 262-63

(1978). The solitary exception recognized by the courts is the admissibility of evidence of convictions qualifying under rule 609(a)(2). Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend FederalRule of Evidence
404(b): The Threat to the Future of the FederalRules of Evidence, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1465, 1480
(1985). Convictions falling within 609(a)(2) appear to be automatically admissible. Id. With that
exception, every type of evidence-including scientific testimony satisfying rule 702-is potentially
subject to exclusion under rule 403.
172. FED. R. EVID. 901. Rule 901(b)(9) states,

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

Issues such as whether the expert may rely on inadmissible hearsay as a source
of the specific facts in the pending case fall on the other side of the line. These

issues bear on the validity of the witness' minor premise. To resolve these issues
the courts should turn to rule 703 and, again, to general provisions including

rule 403. The major premise-minor premise distinction thus forms a superstucture for understanding article VII.

The distinction not only creates a general framework for defining the relationship between the two most important statutes in article VII; the distinction
may also facilitate answering many of the narrower questions of statutory inter-

pretation that have arisen under that article. As previously stated, before the
enactment of the Federal Rules, most jurisdictions followed the Frye general
acceptance test for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.1 73 The
troublesome question is whether the Frye test has survived the adoption of the
Federal Rules. 174 The advocates of the Frye test sometimes cite rule 703 as
support for their position that Frye is still good law.1 75 Rule 703 permits the

judge to exclude information if practitioners of the expert's specialty cannot

"reasonably" rely on that type of data. 17 6 It can be contended that "reason-

ably" should be construed as meaning "customarily." 1 77 So construed, rule 703
codifies Frye; the rule empowers the judge to require that the type of informa-

tion on which the expert relies be customarily or generally accepted. However,
the major premise-minor premise distinction exposes this argument as
wrongminded. The Frye issue relates to the expert's major premise, while rule
By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of
...Process
authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule:
or system. Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a result and showing
that the process of system produces an accurate result.

Id.
The expression "process or system" is broad enough to include scientific techniques. Quite
apart from article VII, rule 901(b)(9) should be construed as requiring the proponent of scientific
testimony to validate the underlying scientific technique by proving its experimental verification. See
generally Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions ofPreliminaryFacts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 577 (1984) (discussing
impact of rule 901(b)(9) on admissibility of scientific evidence; concluding that preliminary fact of a
theory's validity should be determined by judge).
173. P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 4, § 1-5.
174. Eg., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1117 (1979); State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 57, 446 N.E.2d 444, 447 (1983); cf.Barmeyer v.
Montana Power Co., 202 Mont. 185, 193-94, 657 P.2d 594, 598 (1983) (sufficient foundation shown
to permit expert testimony in property damage case), overruled, Martel v. Montana Power Co., 752
P.2d 140 (Mont. 1988).
175. Address by Professor Paul Rothstein, Trial Evidence Committee of the American Bar Association Litigation Section Annual Seminar (March 4-5, 1988) (Rancho Bernardo Inn, San Diego,
California). One of the topics discussed at the seminar was expert testimony. During his presentation, Professor Paul Rothstein of Georgetown University described a case in which he was recently
involved. During the case one of the issues that arose was whether the judge should follow Frye, and
one of the attorneys in the case cited rule 703 to the judge. Professor Rothstein noted that the judge
seemingly relied on rule 703 in deciding to apply Frye. Id.; see also McCormick, Scientific Evidence:
Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IowA L. REV. 879, 888 (1982) ("nothing in Federal
Rules of Evidence, their history or comments indicate an express intention to repudiate the Frye
test").
176. FED. R. EvID. 703.
177. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 276 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub.
nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 575 U.S. 574 (1986).
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703 governs only the content of the witness' minor premise. In this light, it is
spurious to seize on "reasonably" in rule 703 as an indication that the courts
should still enforce Frye under the regime of the Federal Rules.
Another current controversy over article VII is the issue just mentioned,
namely, the meaning of "reasonably" in rule 703. Some courts equate "reasonably" with "customarily." 178 Other courts subscribe to the contrary view that
Congress' choice of "reasonably" connotes that the trial judge can preclude an
expert from relying on a type of data even when it is the customary practice of
the expert's specialty to do so. 179 Just as the major-minor premise distinction
sheds light on the Frye dispute, the distinction should help focus the discussion
of this controversy. In the final analysis, the policy question is whether the
courts should, in effect, delegate the choice of types of information to the scientific community. If "reasonably" means "customarily," the ultimate choice rests
with the scientific community. On this assumption, the courts' only function is
to make the factual determination whether the customary practice exists. 180 If,
however, the use of "reasonably" empowers the judge to second guess the scientific community, the determination remains a judicial responsibility; in making
the determination, the judge is likely to give the specialty's practice great weight,
but the specialty's practice is not dispositive. At this point in the analysis, the
major-minor premise distinction becomes highly relevant. Section II demonstrated that the expert's selection of theories to employ as major premises is
entitled to great deference, but the same section also noted that there is a much
less compelling case to defer to the expert's choice of information to include in
the minor premise. The determination of the facts comprising the minor premise is essentially an exercise of factual analysis rather than scientific expertise. If
the scope of rule 703 is limited to the minor premise, the rule's scope cuts
strongly against interpreting "reasonably" to mean "customarily." In principle
the judiciary should police the reliability of the information factored into the
expert's minor premise, and interpreting "reasonably" as "customarily" would
deprive the courts of the power to do so.
Finally, a lively dispute has arisen over the question whether information
qualifying under rule 703 should be presented to the trier of fact in detail.1 8'
Suppose, for example, that the trial judge decides that in forming her opinion, a
physician may rely on an oral report from another doctor. Although the report
does not satisfy any hearsay exception, 182 the judge believes that the party call178. Id. at 275-79.
179. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1243-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988).
180. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
181. Rose Hall, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corp., 576 F. Supp. 107, 108 (D.
Del. 1983), aff'd, 740 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985); People v. Anderson, 113 Ill. 2d 1, 8-9, 495 N.E.2d 485, 488-89, cert denied, 107 S.Ct. 658 (1986); Long v. State, 649
S.W.2d 363, 364 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
182. As an oral report, the report could not satisfy the requirements of the business entry hearsay exception. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). Assume alternatively that the report is written. If the report
was prepared principally with a view to litigation, again the report might not comply with the business entry exception. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1943); P. GIANNELLI & E.
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 4, § 6-2(c).
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ing the physician should be permitted to use the report for the limited purpose of
showing the bases of the expert's opinion. How far should the physician be
permitted to go in describing the content of the report? Should the physician be
restricted to saying that she is relying in part on another physician's report
describing some symptoms? Should the physician be allowed to go further and
quote the oral report? If the report were in writing, should the report be submitted to the jury for their inspection?
One school of thought is that if a report otherwise satisfies rule 703, the
trier of fact should receive the full detail of the report. 18 3 The advocates of this
school argue that the trier cannot intelligently evaluate the worth of the expert's
opinion unless the trier has the benefit of all the detail of the report. The only
required safeguard is that the judge give the jury a limiting instruction under
Federal Rule of Evidence 105.184 The competing school of thought is that the
judge should be cautious in exposing the jury to independently inadmissible information.18 5 The proponents of this school fear that despite the limiting instruction, the jury will misuse the information as substantive evidence on the
merits of the case.
The major-minor premise distinction proposed by this Article strengthens
the position of the latter school of thought. Section II noted that the danger that
the jury will misuse the information contained in the expert's major premise is
minimal since that information rarely overlaps with the disputed adjudicative
facts in the case. In contrast, the danger of misuse of the information included
in the witness' minor premise is substantial since that information frequently
coincides with controverted facts such as the manner in which the traffic accident causing the personal injuries occurred. Rule 703 should be read as applying only to the information serving as the witness' minor premise. In short, the
rule authorizes reliance on the very type of information that the jury is more
likely to misuse. Understanding the scope of rule 703 makes it easier to appreciate the extent of the danger of the misuse of the information; because the information falling within the rule's purview is included in the expert's minor
premise, the danger will routinely arise. The scope of rule 703, therefore, lends
substance to the argument that, at the very least, judges should exercise discretion in deciding whether to give the jury the full detail of reports qualifying
under rule 703.
It seems clear that there is merit in any proposed distinction that not only
helps establish an 6verall framework for construing article VII but also assists in
resolving the more particular statutory construction issues surrounding the article. More broadly, the proposed major-minor premise distinction should be a
catalyst for the formulation of sounder policy governing expert testimony and
more discerning attacks on expert testimony at trial. Policymakers, courts, and
183. See generally Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basisfor Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. RV. 583 (1987) (facts on data that forms the underlying
basis of the expert's opinion should be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule).
184. FED. R. EVID. 105,.

185. Carlson, supra note 86, at 245 n.44.
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litigators all stand to benefit from the recognition of this distinction. At every
level of analysis, we pay a severe cost for ignoring the distinction: misguided
evidentiary policy, the frustration of the statutory scheme of article VII, and the
failure at trial to expose the genuine weaknesses in scientific testimony. The
appreciation of the distinction is a sine qua non for any critical evaluation of the
admissibility and weight of expert testimony.

